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ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF NAME -

Defendant, a department store, signed plaintiff's name without his knowledge
or consent to a telegram which it caused to be sent to the governor of Oregon.
The telegram urged the veto of a bill which, had it become law, would have
prevented defendant from continuing the practice of optometry. Plaintiff
brought suit to recover damages for the invasion of his right of privacy. HeltJ,
on appeal from the lower court's judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer,
that the complaint stated a cause of action. Hinish 'IJ. Meier & Frank Co.,
(Ore. I94I) I I3 P. (2d) 438.

1942]

RECENT DECISIONS

Since the right of privacy was first advocated by Professors Warren and
Brandeis,1 twelve states,2 together with Alaska 8 and the District of Columbia,4
have apparently accepted the doctrine as part of their common law. 5 To these
is now added Oregon. Early clear-cut recognition and subsequent growth of
the right of privacy was hampered by attempts to fit it into existing categories,
such as implied contract, breach of trust or confidential relationship, or the
violation of a property right. 6 The tendency of more recent decisions to abandon
1

Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905);
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Foster-Milburn Co. v.
Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P.
532 (1918); Melvin v. Reid, u2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); Flake v.
Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938). In some cases the courts,
while basing their decision on other grounds, have asserted the existence of the right.
Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907), property right and fraud on the public; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W.
1076 (19u), property right in a photograph. In others, the right has been recognized
but its application to the particular facts denied. Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia,
192 S. C. 454, 7 S. E. (2d) 169 (1940); Harlow v. Buno Co., 36 Pa. D. & C. 101
(1939). The last named case is a lower court decision. But see the concurring opinion
of Maxley, J., in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631
(1937). The case of McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria, (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25,
1936) is unreported as is the case of Blazek v. Rose, (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill.
1922), printed in PouND and CHAFFEE, CAsEs ON EQuiTABLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PERSONALITY 138 (1930).
8
In Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926), the court did not decide whether the
right existed in view of the presence of the well-recognized exception of public interest.
4- Peed v. Washington Times Co., (D. C. S. Ct. 1927) 55 WAsH. L. REP. 182
(not officially reported).
5
New York and Utah have recognized the right of privacy by legislation. 8 N. Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1916), §§ 50, 51; Utah Rev. Stat. (1933), §§ 103-4-7 to
103-4-9. As to the history of the right of privacy in New York prior to the legislative
action, see Ragland, "The Right of Privacy," 17 KY. L. J. 85 at 91ff. (1929).
6 Some courts, while granting recovery, based their decisions on one of these
grounds. Pollard v. Photographic Co., L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888), implied contract; Prince Albert v. Strange, I Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 2 De G. &
Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849), breach of trust; Routh v. Webster, IO Beav. 561,
50 Eng. Rep. 698 (1847), property right; Walter v. Ashton, [1902] 2 Ch. Div.
282, property right; Dockrell v. Dougall, 78 L. T. R. (Q. B. Div.) 840 (1898), property right; Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907), property
right; Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907),
property right; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911),
property right.
In other cases the right was denied in the absence of these factors. The leading
New York case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E.
442 (1902), gave as additional reasons for its denial of the right the lack of precedent
and a fear of litigation carrying the doctrine to absurdities. Criticism of this decision
led to the legislation mentioned in note 5, sup.ra. See also Henry v. Cherry & Webb,
30 R. I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372,
80 N. W. 285 (1899); Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222
2
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these efforts and base recovery on broader principles of natural justice demonstrates the final acceptance of this new legal doctrine. 7 The limitations which
were advocated at its conception 8 have since been accorded judicial recognition.
As a further qualification the courts generally have restricted the application of
the doctrine to those cases wherein the invasion of plaintiff's privacy was to the
direct economic advantage of the defendant.0 Thus, the three leading early
cases all involved the use of plaintiff's photograph in advertising matter.10 As
frequently occurs in the recognition of a new doctrine, subsequent decisions
tended to restrict its application to the original facts.11 The principal case,
Wis. 512, 269 N. W. 295 (1936); Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691,
117 P. 594 (1911).
7 In the principal case the court said, "But we deem it unnecessary to search for
a right of property, or a contract, or a relation of confidence." 113 P. (2d) 438 at 446.
8 Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 ( I 890).
The limitations suggested were these: that the right would not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest; that it would not prohibit the
communication of any matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is
made under circumstances which would render it a privileged communication according to the law of slander and libel; that the law would not permit redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage; that the right
would cease upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent;
that the truth of the matter published would not be a defense; that the absence of
malice would not be a defense. In Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967
(1927), the Warren-Brandeis limitations were accepted in toto. Most widely discussed and litigated is that relating to matter of public interest. A recent case is Sidis
v. F-R Publishing Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 806, noted in 39 MICH.
L. REV. 501 (1941). See generally, Nizer, "The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's
Developments," 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941). In Harlow v. Buno Co., 36 Pa.
D. & C. IOI ( 1939), it is suggested that the right be limited to intentional invasions
of privacy.
.
9
Ragland, "The Right of Privacy," 17 KY. L. J. 85 (1929); 39 MICH. L. REv.
501 (1941); Melvin v. Reid, n2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). Although two
cases apparently create exceptions to the general rule, they are distinguishable from the
principal case since they do not involve the use of plaintiff's name or photograph.
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931), defendant tapped a
telephone wire and listened to conversations by plaintiff and members of plaintiff's
family; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S. E. (2d)
810 (1939), defendant gathered evidence concerning a pending suit by plaintiff against
defendant by planting a microphone in plaintiff's hospital room.
The "rogues' gallery'' or "mugging'' cases lack the commercial element. It is
submitted, however, that these decisions may be put on the ground of libel. Itzkovitch
v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615,
150 P. 1122 (1915); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909); Mabry v.
Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, n7 S. W. 746 (1909). See 21 R. C. L. 1200 (1918).
10
Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905); FosterMilburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909).
11
The language of Barnhill, J., in Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C.
780 at 791, 195 S. E. 55 (1938), is typical: "So far as we have been able to ascertain,
no court has yet held that it constitutes a tort for a newspaper to publish an image
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unique in its facts, marks a liberalization of this commercial requirement without, however, completely abandoning it. Although defendant's act was aimed
at a possible prevention of an economic loss, under the decision it would seem
that the unauthorized use of plaintiff's name by any taxpayer in connection with
proposed governmental expenditures would create liability without regard to the
extent of the ultimate tax burden. That the Oregon court would take the
additional step of granting recovery when the proposed legislation involved no
possible .financial advantage to the defendant is hardly to be questioned: The
controlling feature of the principal case appears to be the fact that the attainment
of the financial objective was contingent upon action, not by the consuming
public or the plaintiff himself, but by the government.12 Thus the right of
privacy is made to extend to a new and important :field in which less emphasis
is placed on the commercial character of defendant's act than on its effect upon
matters of general public welfare, such as the formulation of the public policy
of the state. It is submitted that the monetary criterion is unsatisfactory since
plaintiff's injury is neither dependent upon nor necessarily proportionate to
defendant's gain.

of an individual when such publication is not libelous, except when such publication
involves the breach of a trust, the violation of a contract, or when the photograph
is used in connection with some commercial enterprise, and we are presently called upon
to decide only the right of an individual to prohibit the unauthorized use of an image
of her features and figure in connection with and as a part of an advertisement."
•
The advertising or trade purposes test has been incorporated in the only legislative protection of the right of privacy. 8 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1916), §§
50, 51; Utah Rev. Stat. (1933), §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9. Apparently no cases have
arisen under the latter statute. Cases construing "advertising purposes" and ''purposes of
trade" in New York include the following: Riddle v. MacFadden, 201 N. Y. 215, 94
N. E. 644 (19u); Almind v. Sea Beach R. R., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N. Y. S.
842 (1913), reversing 78 Misc. 445, 139 N. Y. S. 559 (1940); Freed v. Loew's
Inc., 175 Misc, 616, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 679 (1940); Fisher v. Murray M. Rosenberg,
Inc. 175 Misc. 370, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 677 (1940); Lane v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
171 Misc, 66, II N. Y. S. (2d) 199 (1939), affd. 256 App. Div. 1065, 12 N. Y. S.
(2d) 352 (1939); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. S. 382 (1937);
Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999 (1914);
Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S. 829
(1915).
12 Cf, State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 P. 317 (1924), where
a writ of mandamus was granted to restrain the unauthorized use by a political group
of the name of Robert M. La Follette, It is to be noted that the same court had refused
earlier to recognize the right of privacy. Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash.
691, u7 P. 594 (19n).

